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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE ENDANGERED CENTER IN
AMERICAN POLITICS
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF*

Arnold Schwarzenegger's election as governor of California is a
crowning achievement of the plebiscitary movement in American
politics. A celebrity with built-in appeal, no political experience, no
connection to the political machines, no clear fiscal policy,' and no
readily discernible programmatic mandate, he nonetheless swept
through a field of over 100 candidates,2 received about half of all
votes cast, and easily dislodged a recently elected incumbent.'
How could this be? For Gray Davis and the activist core of the
Democratic Party, this was another manifestation of a massive right
wing conspiracy,4 a refusal to let the electoral will of the people
prevail, and the continuation of a political trajectory that ran
* Harold R. Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School. 2004
Cutler Lecture. I am deeply indebted to Joshua Wilkenfeld for excellent research assistance.
Many of the ideas in this Essay grew out of ongoing exchanges with Richard Briffault and
Jeremy Waldron. I thank Jessica Issacharoff for suggesting the title.
1. See Doug Smith, A Very Clear Vision for State, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at B1
(describing Schwarzenegger's fiscal policy objectives as facially contradictory).
2. Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the CaliforniaRecall, 153 U. PA_ L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 15-17, on file with author).
3. See The Recall Election, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9,2003, at A27 (detailing election results and
over
crediting Schwarzenegger with winning forty-nine percent of the vote, placing him above
one hundred other candidates).
4. See Steve Lopez, Points West: Arnold vs. the Vast Left-Wing Conspiracy, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2003, at B1.
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through the impeachment of Bill Clinton and the Florida recount
fiasco. For the Republicans, the election seemed more hopeful.
Perhaps the party could restore its appeal from the days before Pete
Wilson launched a presidential campaign based on hostility to
immigration and affirmative action.5 Perhaps the charge of tax-andspend had finally taken hold and the Republican message would
again prevail.6
In this Essay, I will suggest that both the Democrats and
Republicans miss the mark. Schwarzenegger's election was
neither the product of a vast conspiracy nor the realization of the
Republican agenda for California. More precisely, there may have
been a conspiracy and there may have been those suddenly absorbed
by the Republican platform, but neither appears to have been the
animating force behind the rather stunning electoral victory.
Rather, it was the rebellion of the median voter, the center of
American politics, against the perceived closing-off of the political
process to competitive pressures. In setting out this claim, I will
touch on three broad themes. The first is the troubling and complicated role of the plebiscite in a representative democracy. Here my
argument will be that whatever the difficulties associated with
bypassing the structured political process, the referendum/initiative
process has emerged unexpectedly as a last ditch safety valve for the
electorate at large to claim some accountability from the governing
political class. The second is that the move toward plebiscitary
democracy is tied into the increased non-responsiveness of the
political process. The added step here is to argue that there has
been a marked drop in competitiveness of legislative elections and
that this has prompted repeated efforts to breakup the results of
gerrymanders and other mechanisms that function to lock up the
political process. The third is the role that constitutional law has
played in furthering the decrease in competition in the political
process and the consequences from this reduction in competitive5. See Mark Z. Barabak & Cathleen Decker, InitiativeSparks Debate at GOPConvention,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at A3 (describing California Republican support for propositions
perceived as being against bilingual education as potentially driving Hispanic voters
away
from the California Republican party).
6. See, e.g., Hugo Martin, Emboldened GOP Ponders the Odds of Unseating Boxer, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, at B1 (discussing the Republican party's increased hopes of unseating
the Democratic elected officeholder).
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ness. I will conclude by looking at the issues presented in the
California recall as reflective of the historic tension in democratic
governance between the need to reward majoritarian preferences
and the protection of minority interests.
I. PLEBISCITES AND THE HISTORIC COMMITMENT TO
REPUBLICANISM

Plebiscites, as well as most forms of direct democratic rule, in
many ways form the vulnerable underside of democracy. Majorities
swept along by passion or factional interest can command the
instrumentalities of power to reward the useless unduly or immunize themselves from electoral accountability. As John Ely once
summarized one of our Nation's founding concerns, "an untrammeled majority is indeed a dangerous thing.... " In constructing the
Constitution, the founding generation sought to constrain the power
of local majorities to oppress minority interests.' As a result of this
tension between majority and minority interests, the Constitution
guarantees republican government in each state by interposing
numerous institutional barriers between the direct preferences of
voters and levers of power.' In composing the federal government,
the Constitution expresses distaste for direct democracy with
differing degrees of separation between popular voting and the
election of officials. Under the unamended Constitution, the
electoral college and state legislators served as barriers between
0
state populations and the election of presidents and senators." All
of these procedures and guarantees expressed a general dislike of
the Founding era for the processes of direct democracy. The use of
representative democracy naturally complemented the balance of
7. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 8 (1980).

8. See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with
Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 556 n.119 (1994).

9. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
11. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (granting power of electing senators to state
legislatures), with U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (reassigning the power of electing senators to the
people directly); James A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of

Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 125 (2000) (describing republican governance as a
"trustee" model).
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power structural barriers in place against the immediate exercise
of the political will of the majority. 2
In spite of this initial disfavor, plebiscites and other forms of
direct democracy persist, in the form of initiatives, referendums,
and now, famously, recalls. Particularly in the states west of the
Mississippi-those whose foundings reflected the political impulses
of populism-some variant of referendum or initiative is a common
part of the political landscape. 3 A century ago, in Pacific States
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 4 the Supreme Court confronted head on the constitutionality of the referendum in the
context of a special tax levied against a utility. 5 In many ways, this
case presented the Madisonian nightmare: a mobilized majority,
swept along by its passions, using direct elections to seize the
wealth of a disfavored minority. The Court avoided the deep
constitutional question by declaring the entire matter nonjusticiable and delivering the Republican Guarantee Clause to the
constitutional purgatory known as the political question doctrine' 6a state of limbo from which that clause has yet to emerge. Through
a rather tortured logical chain, the Court found that if the presence
of an initiative meant that the government of a given state was not
republican, then the entire state government would be illegitimate
and in need of replacement-a matter for which the Court was
17
institutionally not competent.
Even beyond its role as a form of plebiscitary democracy, the
recall suffers another infirmity in the eyes of the Framers.
The Madisonian concern for majorities succumbing to passion
also manifested itself in the Framers designing constitutional
12. See Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The LeastAccountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 1, 3-10 (1997) (explaining founding generation's rejection of direct democracy
in the Constitution).
13. For an account of the populist origins of the California recall process in the early 20th
century as part of an effort to remove corrupt officials beholden to the railroads, see Garrett,
supra note 2 (manuscript at 2; Joshua Spivak, Why Did CaliforniaAdopt the Recall?, (Sept.
15, 2003), availableat http://hnn.us/articles/1682.html.
14. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
15. Id. at 133-37.
16. See id. at 147 (declaring that questions over whether a state's governing processes are
sufficiently republican are for resolution by processes of state government and congressional
standards of admission of senators and representatives from the states are beyond the
capacity ofjudicial tribunals).
17. Id. at 140-42.
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protections for governors against immediate accountability to the
preferences of the electorate. Thus, Alexander Hamilton wrote that
an executive without the sinecure of a fixed term of office "mightlay
[his office] down, unless continued by a new choice; and if he should
be desirous of being continued, his wishes conspiring with his fears
would tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or debase
his fortitude."" According to Hamilton, the
republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they
entrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require
an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion,
or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from
the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their
interests.1 9
Madison tied the length of office to a belief that sensible government requires the occasional adoption of "well connected measures,
which have a gradual ... operation."" Since these operations will not
bear immediate public fruit, though they may incur immediate
costs, officials must be guaranteed a stay in office long enough to
ensure the public cannot overreact to costs without witnessing the
benefits.2 ' According to Madison, "it is evident, that an assembly
elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one
or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare
may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final
result."2 2 The need to plan over extended time horizons while
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
19. Id. at 393. See also Garrett, supra note 2 (manuscript at 37-40). Garrett argues that
a similar harm to legislation may result from the specter of recall processes hanging over
legislators. In jurisdictions allowing immediate recall of elected officials, office-holders may
have to fear for the opinion of those who would potentially recall them. These voters may be
different (likely more extreme) than the median voter. The result is, even if a recall is not
conducted, the possibility of recall proceedings leads to compression of the time horizons of
politicians.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 306 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
21. For a more complete exposition ofthe political theory underlying fixed, extended terms
in office, see William R. Keech, Thinking about the Length and Renewability of Electoral
Terms, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 104-10 (Bernard Grofinan
& Arend Lijphart eds., 1986), which discusses and expands on different theories supporting
prolonged terms in office.
22. Madison, supra note 20.
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preserving accountability is a perpetual tension in governance, as
much in the public domain as in the private corporation.2 3
Yet plebiscitary mechanisms persist. Leaving aside its questionable constitutional pedigree, two major arguments have been
advanced as to why we should, at the very least, be willing to give
direct democracy some credence. First, direct democracy may
counter problems of legislative entrenchment. My colleague Richard
Briffault, for example, points to the repeated invocation of initiatives and referenda, in states that have them, to compel unwilling
and self-interested legislatures to submit to term limits, campaign
finance regulations, and the like.' I confess to being sympathetic to
destabilizing mechanisms that can thwart the tendency of incumbents to lock in their political positions by constricting competitive
challenges.25 My former colleague Lynn Baker advances another
position, arguing that direct democracy mechanisms allow welldeveloped and controversial issues to be decided as first-order
matters not subject to legislative log-rolling.2 6 In her view, legislative politics may be freed to consider more clearly the public good if
not forced to play out issues, such as gun control or abortion, that
are both divisive and subject to intense special interest factionalism.
Leaving aside the constitutionality of specific state regulations on
such controversial matters, there is a strong argument that
democracy functions best when certain issues are off the table.
Thus, one "enabling" function of constitutionalism is precisely to set

23. The converse of this problem is also true. In allowing direct democratic processes,
populations can bind the government to costly projects, without anyone being accountable for
the long-term sensibility of those projects. See Garrett, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34)
(reporting that, by some estimates, California initiatives have left thirty to seventy percent
of state budget constitutionally bound to fulfilling wishes expressed in initiatives).
24. See Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1367-73 (1985).
Under this view, the existence of direct democracy provisions further serve as indirect checks
on legislative policy, even when initiatives are not directly used to make law. For an analysis
of the prospect that legislatures may be forced to bargain in the shadow of initiatives, see
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of PopularInitiatives, 40 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 99, 99-106, 107-12, 124-25 (1996).
25. See Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets: PartisanLockups of
the DemocraticProcess,50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 651, 699-707, 716-17 (1998).
26. Lynn A. Baker, DirectDemocracy andDiscrimination:A Public Choice Perspective, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 744 (1991).
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the ground rules and allow democratic politics to play out without
everything being up for grabs."
I will now add one further consideration that ties direct democracy back to the Schwarzenegger election. Direct democracy may
serve to restore competitiveness to the political process and thus
ensure that legislative politics not be hijacked too far from the
preferences of the median voter.
II. REGRESSION TO THE POLITICAL MEAN
At first blush, to speak of the preferences of the median voter not
being honored, or as in the title of this Essay, to speak of an
endangered center in American politics, appears bizarre. It is well
accepted in political theory that winner-take-all elections from
single-member districts will tend to produce two, and only two,
parties and that, over time, both parties will drift ideologically
toward proximate centrist positions. In the world of political theory,
this phenomenon is referred to as Duverger's Law.2" The concept can
be expressed, based on the work of Harold Hotelling in economics
and Anthony Downs in political science,29 by relying on a spatial
model of political distributions.

27. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195-98 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (arguing

that, contrary to the views of Tribe, Hayek, and others, there is no "irreconcilable 'tension'
between constitutionalism and democracy"); Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of
DemocraticConstitutionalism:Fixed Rules and Some Implications for ContestedPresidential
Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1988-91 (2003) (crediting constitutions with empowering
political processes by removing certain issues from the realm of political discourse).
28. See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 216-28 (Barbara North & Robert North
trans., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2d ed. 1962) (1951); see also GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTES
COUNT 13-33 (1997) (offering an extended discussion of Duverger's Law); Samuel Issacharoff,
Supreme Court Destabilizationof Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 236
n.153 (1995). By comparing proportional representation systems with territorially-based
electoral systems, Duverger focused on the fact that in territorial districts, the winner in any
given district gets the seat and the losers get nothing. This electoral form, often termed "first
past the post," has the effect of "wasting" all votes not gained by a winner, unlike proportional
systems in which all votes may contribute to the proportionate distribution of seats. The final
step in the "law" is to show that parties and the electorate respond to the risk of wasting votes
on non-winning candidates by gravitating toward large party structures that hew sufficiently
to the center to attract the critical median voters. See DUVERGER, supra.
29. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957); Harold
Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929).
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The model, as originally envisioned by Hotelling, runs as follows.
Imagine a town that runs along a one-mile main street, with its
population spread evenly along that distance. Further imagine that
there are two gas stations in town. The optimal arrangement in
terms of minimizing driving distance to a gas station would be for
each to be half way between the town boundary and the midpoint.
The problem is that if one sets up at the quarter-mile marker, the
other one will set up just the other side so as to be able to be the
closest station for three quarters of the town's population. In the
bizarre world of zero transaction costs known only to economists,
the two competitors would then leapfrog each other until they
arrived at a stable equilibrium. As anyone who has ever driven into
a small town with two filling stations knows, that equilibrium is in
the center of town, where each filling station is located right across
the street from the other.
Downs generalized this spatial model to the political process. In
a two party system, each party seeks an ideological position wherein
it will attract more voters than the alternative party. If party A
were to stake positions more liberal than those held by seventy
percent of the population, another party could choose one of two
ideologies. It could be slightly more liberal, and therefore be more
appealing to the thirty percent of voters to the political left of A. Or,
more successfully, the second party could stake an ideological
position slightly to the right of A, thereby appealing to seventy
percent of the voting public. Not to be outdone, of course, in a two
party system, political theory forecasts that parties will continue
this game of maneuvering ideologies to capture voter interest until
both parties represent positions around those of the median voter.
Where one party is marginally more liberal than the median voter
and the other party is marginally more conservative, each party's
policies appeal to fifty percent of the electorate. At this point, an
equallibrium is reached and no more maneuvering can be successful
in attracting a greater share of the electorate. Where parties have
not hewn back toward the center, as with the failed candidacies of
Barry Goldwater in 1964 and George McGovern in 1972, the result
has been an electoral fiasco.3"
30. See Godfrey Sperling, Dole Must Appeal to Conservative and ModerateRepublicans,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 13, 1996, at 19 (suggesting that to have any chance of success,
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While American elections are decided by the first past the post
method, the paradox is that the two major American parties have
become decidedly less centrist over the past fifty years. Viewed from
a comparative international perspective, the two major parties
still appear quite centrist. There is a stronger ideological gulf
between them, however, which requires some explanation. Despite
the fact that the population as a whole has not changed its levels
of partisanship, Congressional Republicans and Democrats have
ideologically shifted to the right and left, respectively.
The first step in solving this apparent paradox is to recognize that
American elections are a two-step process. To run successfully in
the general election, a candidate must first capture the nomination
of one of the two major parties. If we crudely characterize the
Democrats as the party of the left and the Republicans as the party
of the right, then the same Hotelling-Downs equilibrium will play
out in the primary process, yielding candidates who are likely to be
significantly to the left and right of the center. In prior writings, I
have described this two-step process as providing necessary
competitive grist to American politics.3 1 The result is the familiar
practice, at least historically, of Democratic candidates running left
in the primary and rediscovering the center in the general election,
while Republican candidates look decidedly more conservative in the
primaries and more compassionate in the general election. As the
political scientist John Aldrich has explained, it is the need to
prevail in the primaries and to maintain the aroused support of the
party faithful that keeps the American parties from collapsing
entirely into the center, as Duverger and Downs might have
predicted.3 2
Even if we push the equilibrium model to a remove from the
center, there remains the paradox that American politics since at
least the 1960s has shown greater divergence from the median in
candidate opinions,3 3 yielding a significantly greater ideological
presidential candidates must develop a moderate compromise between the liberal and
conservative extremes).
31. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and PartisanCompetition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 298-304 (2001)
[hereinafter Issacharoff, Private Parties].
32. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICA 180-93 (1995).
33. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CuLTURE WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 78

424

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:415

divide among elected representatives. In Congress, for example,
Republican positions are now twice as far away from Democratic
positions as they were before the 1960s. At the same time, however,
the strength of partisan identification by the citizenry has diminished: individuals are less likely to identify with partisan positions
today than they were in the 1950s.34 Additionally, while low voter
turnout has increasingly left national elections in the hands of
partisans, the change in turnout over the years is not sufficient to
explain the growth in the extremism of elected officials.35
Before turning to the causal factors, let me give a thumbnail
sketch of the evidence. Although there are different explanations for
the increase in polarization," the consensus of political science
observation is as follows. The parties in both Congress" and the
state legislatures" are more polarized and more homogeneous than
they have been at almost any time in the 20th century.3 9 The
distribution of power in the legislative caucuses is bimodal, with
relatively high peaks away from the center.4 ° In other words, there
are few center-oriented Democrats or Republicans. Both are drawn
(2004) ("For as long as we have had data, political scientists have known that political elites
are more polarized than the mass of ordinary Americans.").
34. Id. at 25-28.
35. See id. at 98-100. Fiorina shows that while strong partisans are more likely to vote
than independents and weak partisans, their voting rate has been consistent over the past
forty years.
36. See generally Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party
Strategy, and ConditionalParty Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000, 47
AM. J. POL. ScI. 305 (2003) (discussing explanations for increased polarization in Congress,
including changes in electoral conditions, party strategies, and policy agendas).
37. See id. at 305 (citing increase in the frequency of party votes and increase in difference
between median ideological scores for Congressmen since 1970).
38. See Gerald C. Wright & Brian F. Schaffner, The Influence ofParty: Evidence from the
State Legislatures, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 374-77 (2002) (noting how state legislators
display polarized ideologies both during campaigns and votes in partisan legislatures).
39. This measure is based on what are known as the Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nomiate Scores.
See KEITH T. POOLE & HOwARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POUITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ROLL CALL VOTING 229-51 (1997). For applications to recent Congresses, see Gary C.
Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the CongressionalElections
of 2000, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 5, 18-24 (2001); Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory? 153 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 22-26, on file with author) [hereinafter Ortiz, Got Theory].
40. See Roberts & Smith, supra note 36, at 311-12. Roberts and Smith discuss how the
median point for each party has gradually moved towards that party's extreme, leaving more
political distance between the median points of the two parties. This necessarily implies a
bimodal distribution, as a single mode could only occur if the medians for both parties were
in the political center.
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well toward the poles. At the same time, we see no such bimodal
distribution of preferences in the populace as a whole.4 ' Instead,
there is a typical bell-shaped distribution with a relatively pronounced peak as most Americans gravitate toward the center on a
distribution of positions.4 ' As a result, the elected representatives
are increasingly removed from the population's preferences and are
unaccountable to changes in the desires or views of the electorate.
This is especially problematic in the House of Representatives, as
the body that the Founders crafted to be intimately in touch with
43
the movements in political sentiments of the populous as a whole.
I now turn to the causal factors for what Dan Ortiz has termed the
high agency costs 44 in representation and to the consequences for
our political system.

III. THE DECLINE OF THE CENTER
Why are elected officials more polarized while the population as
a whole is not? I suggest three causal factors, two of them having to
do with the distortive effects that districts have on political
preferences. First, the equipopulation requirement following each
decennial census itself has an impact. In California, for example,
the fact that all districts are drawn with equal population as
opposed to equal numbers of voters tends to magnify Hispanic
political power and leads to relatively fewer votes being cast in
heavily Latino districts than in other districts.4 5 To the extent that
Latinos have distinctive political preferences, the districting system
overweights them relative to what would be the case in a direct

41. See John H. Evans, Have Americans'Attitudes Become More Polarized?An Update,
84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71, 76-78 (2003) (finding no change in polarization of electorate over the last
thirty years).
42. See id. at 76-78, 86. Upon studying attitudes across a variety of issues, Evans
concludes that there has been no increase in bimodality across the American population. In
fact, over several issues studied, Evans points to a decrease in polarization, with the
population's ideologies drifting more towards the center.
43. See Ortiz, Got Theory, supra note 39 (manuscript at 18-23) (discussing the Framers'
conceptions of the role of the House of Representatives).
44. Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment and Incumbency: Leading the
Legislatureto Police Itself, 4 J.L. & POL. 653, 672-81 (1988).

45. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763,773-76 (9th Cir. 1990) (voting rights
challenge addressing whether the baseline for population equality should be voters or people).
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plebiscite where only voters could participate. 46 There is some
evidence that there are further distortive effects from population
shifts during the ten-year cycle from urban and rural areas to
suburban growth spots.4 7
A second factor playing into polarization results from changes in
strategy by American political parties. The prevailing wisdom had
always been that the outcome of an election is determined by which
party won the median voter. In an electorate where about half the
potential voters actually vote,48 the parties have learned that they
may gain many votes by altering the mix of who votes rather than
assuming the median positions of the likely electorate. The need to
mobilize the base to get participation is a lesson drawn from the
earliest days of political parties in the nascent Republic.4 9 Indeed,
despite the Framers' well documented antipathy toward any type of
organized factions, the founding generation turned to the incipient
forms of political parties as early as 1796, and certainly by the
dramatic election of 1800, to combat the perceived apathy of masses
of voters and to provide an organizational form through which to
encourage participation. 0

46. But see Jonathan Nagler & R. Michael Alvarez, Latinos, Anglos, Voters, Candidates,
and Voting Rights, U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 7-9, on file with author).
47. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in
the Latest Round of CongressionalRedistricting,2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 193 (2003).
48. See e.g., Debra J. Saunders, Citizenship Troopers, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2004, at D4
(describing decline in presidential election voter turnout from more than 60% in 1960 to 51.3%
in 2000). These numbers both overstate and understate turnout, in that turnout will generally
be highest for presidential elections; see, e.g., Joe Andrew, Everyone Loses If We Play This
Game, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at B3 (describing how turnout in off-term elections is even
lower than for presidential elections, with only 36% of eligible voters turning out to vote in
the 1998 elections); Katheleen Conti, Off-Year Election CalledPoorRedistrictingTest, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 21, 2003, at 1 (explaining that off-year elections always produce lower turnout
than presidential elections, while at the same time not accounting for the rise of ineligible
voters among the voting age population as a result of recent immigration and felon
disenfranchisement).
49. See ALDRICH, supra note 32, at 45-50, 97-106 (explaining how, since the founding days
of the Republic, successful politicians needed not only broad electoral support but also the
passionate support of partisans able to mobilize voters); Issacharoff, Private Parties,supra
note 31, at 301 (observing that "current Republicans and Democrats find [that] their party
activists propel candidates decidedly more to the right and left, respectively, than the
potentially victorious electoral base of the parties").
50. For an excellent account of the role of mobilizing voter turnout in prompting early
party organization, see ALDRICH, supra note 32, at 97-125.
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51
The parties have fastened upon that in the modern era, with the
assistance of targeted communications such as radio, e-mail and
websites, with increasing election-day emphasis on rousing the
intensely partisan base of the party rather than focusing candidate
appeals on the political center. Particularly in low profile elections,
or whenever turnout is low, this strategy is especially effective since
fewer votes will be necessary in the low turnout race to produce a
victorious election.5 2 This strategy has great allure because politics
has increasingly become the domain of the activist wings of the
parties. As Robert Putnam explains:

Americans at the political poles are more engaged in civic life,
whereas moderates have tended to drop out.... Moreover, this
correlation between ideological "extremism" and participation
strengthened over the last quarter of the twentieth century, as
people who characterize themselves as being "middle of the
road" ideologically have disproportionately disappeared from
public meetings, local organizations, political parties, rallies,
and the like.53
To the extent that activists are a more likely source of campaign
funds, our financing system may also unwittingly contribute to the
polarization of politics.'
While strategies and the distribution of power among districts
may compound partisan distortions, my primary attention is on the
effects of the elimination of effective competition within gerrymandered districts. My argument is simply that these districts have the
effect of eliminating the second-stage election that pulls partisan
impulses back toward the electoral center. If individual districts are
configured so that they are accountable to only one party's voters,

51. See Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft's Ascent, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50, 63
(recounting Karl Rove's statement that past Republican failures are largely based on a failure
to have maximized the number of religious conservatives coming to the polls).
52. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 193-94.
53. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 342 (2000).

54. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1170-74, 1189
(1994) (blaming campaign finance system for exacerbating the fractious nature of American
politics).
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candidates and parties in those districts will have no incentive to
chase the median voter from the district as a whole.55
That gerrymandering produces partisan distortions is not difficult
to document. For example, in those states where Democrats
controlled the last redistricting process, Al Gore won 51.5% of the
vote, while Democrats won 57.1% of the Congressional seats.56
Assuming that a vote for Al Gore is a good proxy for Democratic
ideology, one should anticipate, with districts that reflect the
political diversity of the state as a whole, that Democrats should win
approximately the same proportion of districts as they did of the
presidential vote. The difference between the two percentages
indicates that districts are intentionally constructed to be noncompetitive, removing the power of centrist voters. The Republican
side presents the case even more strongly. There, in states where
Republicans controlled redistricting, George Bush won 53.1% of the
vote, while Republicans won congressional elections in 66.7% of
districts. Intentional gerrymandering aimed at moving the median
ideology point in individual districts is the cause of this difference.
The cost, however, is not so much in the partisan consequences
but in the utter lack of competitive accountability of incumbent
officeholders to voters. In 2002, in the wake of the post-Census
redistricting, there were at most forty-four congressional elections
that were considered by the political parties and the media to be
competitive elections where either a Republican or Democrat could
conceivably win, while informed commentary put the number at
around seventeen.57 The problem is not with the total number, but
with the denominator. In 2002, all 435 House seats were up for
reelection, compared with only 36 governorships and 34 Senate
seats.

55. See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 33, at 78-89. Fiorina explains that if districts are not
ideologically identical to one another, the game theory model is still predictive, but will not
result in successful candidates who are as centrist as the national population. Rather,
candidates and parties will drift to the center of each district.
56. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 200.
57. See, e.g., Gary Martin, Races Now in Homestretch, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov.
3, 2002, at IA (commenting, based on research from Zogby polling, that only seventeen U.S.
House races seemed very competitive); see David Postman, Why So Many Races Lack One
Thing: Competition,SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at Al. According to this article, only thirtynine congressional races were truly competitive in 2002.
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Even these numbers hide the real extent of the lack of competition borne out of redistricting. One of the congressional races
considered competitive was in South Dakota, a state with only one
5
congressional district and no capacity for gerrymandering. " Four
competitive races were in Iowa, where redistricting is done by
59
computer without control by incumbent political forces. In some
other cases, competitiveness only arose when a state's congressional delegation shrank in the wake of the 2000 Census, forcing
60
one incumbent to run against another. Finally, there were the
in
exceptional districts that managed to vote out incumbents 6either
2
6 ' or plagued by scandal (Gary Condit).
jail (Jim Traficant)
The aggregate picture shows the real lack of competition. In 2000,
98.5% of incumbents won their elections," with over 75% of the
winners defeating their challengers by at least twenty percentage
points.6 4 This statistic which shows that the normal incumbent wins
by a landslide actually obscures the extreme victories experienced
by some incumbents. For example, in Massachusetts, incumbents
won by far more than twenty percentage points-beating their
competition by an average of 71.9%.65 The 2002 elections continued
the same trend, with only four congressional incumbents losing to
their challengers, and only forty-three incumbents receiving less
58. See Jake Thompson & C. David Kotok, Nebraska MonitoringContests on its Borders,
Several Midwest Races May Determine the Balance of Power in Governorships and in
Congress, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 3, 2003, at Al (identifying South Dakota as one of

several competitive races).
59. See Adam Clymer, Why Iowa Has So Many Hot Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, § 4,
at 5; see also David Daley, Democracy is Dead in Connecticut,THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec.
22,2002, at 5 (lamentinglack of electoral competition in Connecticut and advocating adoption
of nonpartisan commissions to redraw congressional districts to restore competition).
60. See, e.g., Francine Kiefer, Early Census Snapshot:A Boost for Republicans,CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 2000, at 1 (discussing how in states whose congressional delegations
shrink as result of the census, incumbents will have to battle one another).
61. See Tom Diemer, Ryan Steels Himself as Traficant'sReplacement, CLEVLEAND PLAIN
DEALER, Nov. 25, 2002, at Al.
62. See Bill Keller, America's Most Wanting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A17.
63. See Ellen Goodman, The Winner Is ... Nobody, BALT. SUN, Nov. 11, 2002, at 9A (citing
high incumbent success rate in the U.S. House).
64. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2002),
available at http.//www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/house.xls (last viewed February 15, 2004)
(showing margins of victories of House incumbents).
65. See id. (statistics on margin of victory in Massachusetts' ten districts).
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than sixty percent of the vote.66 Competition was so absent in
some states that over one-third of state congressional delegations
experienced no change during the 2002 election, with about twenty
percent of seats totally uncontested.6 7 To capture the impact of the
gerrymander, consider the traditional definition of a landslide in
American politics: a victory by greater than a 60-40 margin. Now
consider California, where voters rebelled en masse to displace an
elected governor and vote in Schwarzenegger. In the 2002 elections,
not a single challenger in the general elections for Congress in
California districts received over forty percent of the vote.6" In
other words, every single incumbent in California won by landslide
margins.
It is, of course, possible that high rates of incumbent reelection
reflect nothing more than voter satisfaction with their representatives, an odd claim for California given the immediate and unceremonious turning out of the governor. Even this would ill explain the
increase in the rate of incumbent reelection immediately before
and after a redistricting cycle. Elections in 2002-the election year
immediately following redistricting-were less competitive than
the previous election year, as seventy more congressional races went
unchallenged in 2002 than in the previous election year, repeating
and accentuating a pattern that began with the post-1980 redistricting.69 The consequences are not just incumbent sinecure but
nonresponsive and increasingly dysfimctional governance. As Dan
Ortiz aptly explains:
A national swing of five percent in voter opinion-a sea change
in most elections-will change very few seats in the current
66. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2002: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2003), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2002/2002fedresults.xls (last visited February 15, 2004)
(presenting margin of victory results for 2002 House elections); Ortiz, Got Theory, supra note
38 (manuscript at 20).
67. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2002: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. HOUSE DELEGATIONS:
STATES IN WHICH ALL INCUMBENTS SOUGHT RE-ELECTION AND WON 31 (2003), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2002/housemap3.htm (last visited February 15, 2004); Ortiz, Got
Theory, supra note 39 (manuscript at 20).
68. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 182.
69. See Daley, supra note 59, at 5 (describing decreasing level of competition since 1992);
Ortiz, Got Theory, supra note 39 (manuscript at 20-23).
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House of Representatives. Gerrymandering thus creates a kind
of inertia arresting the House's dynamic process. It makes it less
certain that votes in the chamber will reflect shifts in popular
opinion and thus frustrates change and creates undemocratic
°
slippage between the people and their government.
The distancing of elected representatives from the median voters
was not the express aim of gerrymandering. Rather it was the
consequence of providing ideologically safe districts that succored
the reelection hopes of incumbents. The political preferences of the
polity were not the direct target; they were simply collateral damage
in the fight for incumbent sinecure.
IV. THE JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL NON-COMPETITION

Unfortunately, the decline in competition through gerrymandering is an insider's game, normally immune from public concern. Of
late, however, gerrymandering has caught the public eye through
bizarre antics in Colorado and Texas, and-at last-from some
attention to the stunning lack of electoral competition in congressional and state legislative elections. 7 ' That self-interest should prevail
when incumbent political powers are given control over redistricting
is perhaps not surprising. It is worth pausing, however, to examine
the acquiescence of the judiciary, which presumptively should be
expected to rise to restrain the self-serving ambitions of the political
7
branches.
I have previously addressed the role that judicial acquiescence
has played in the increasingly brazen manipulation of the redistricting process.7 3 The condensed version starts with the now familiar
70. Ortiz, Got Theory, supra note 39 (manuscript at 31).
71. See, e.g., Daley, supra note 59 (blaming redistricting, among other things, for lack of
competition); The PartisanFix, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2003, at B6 ("The principal reason so
few challenges are being mounted is that they would stand little chance of winning. And a
major reason for that is redistricting ...."); Voting Without a Choice, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003,

at A30 ("Until the corrupt redistricting process is reformed, competition will continue to be
the loser.").
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)

(proposing checks and balances to counteract desire for aggrandizement of power, under
recognition that "[aimbition must be made to counteract ambition").

73. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics:The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of

Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1643, 1669-75 (1993); see also Samuel Issacharoff,

432

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:415

observation that the Supreme Court's central opinion in this area
set such a high barrier to any effective judicial review of political
gerrymandering as to render the process worthless. In Davis v.
Bandemer,4 the Supreme Court confronted Indiana Republicans'
successful gerrymandering efforts. After redistricting, Indiana
Democrats received more than a majority of the statewide vote, but
won only around forty percent of state assembly seats.7 5 Although
the Court acknowledged that party driven redistricting was
constitutionally suspect, it only allowed a remedy when "the
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political
process as a whole."76
Some have challenged the usefulness of this standard,7 7 but that
understates the problem. The failure in Bandemer was not the test
actually employed, but the conceptualization of the problem.
Bandemer sought to integrate the concept of partisan gerrymandering into the minority voting rights cases by essentially setting out
a test for when a political party faced such "discrimination" that it
too might be thought of as a "discrete and insular minorit[y]," the
formulation of the famous CaroleneProductsfootnote." Neither the
systemic loss of competition nor the attendant diminution in
accountability to the voters is effectively captured by the application
of the discrimination model.
A useful illustration may be found in the flip-side of Bandemer
-the less recognized but even more troubling case of Gaffney v.
Cummings,7 9 in which the Court considered a challenge to a
bipartisan carve-up of Connecticut to ensure a high level of
reelection among incumbents.8 " Viewed through a discrimination
lens, the Court could detect no adverse effects from a redistricting
that all participants proclaimed to have produced a "politically fair"

Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 597, 601, 630-45 (2002)
[hereinafter Issacharoff, Gerrymandering].
74. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id. at 132.
77. Ortiz, Got Theory, supra note 39 (manuscript at 35-39).
78. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
79. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
80. Id. at 738-39.
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result."' So long as all political insiders signed off on the deal, the
Court could identify no constitutional infirmity. The bipartisan, or
sweetheart, gerrymander has now taken hold across the country,
except where one party is in a position to try to do in the other, as
in Texas or Colorado.
Underlying the Court's treatment ofthe partisan gerrymandering
cases is a surprising and disturbing inattentiveness to the value of
competition itself in the election process. A broad range of writers,
from Joseph Schumpeter to Richard Posner, have examined the role
of elections in ensuring democratic legitimacy and have concluded,
as have I, that after-the-fact accountability is the key to democratic
governance. 2 As political scientist Bingham Powell observes,
Few contrasts between dictatorship and democracy are sharper
than this one: in a democracy the citizens can vote the leaders
out of office. The citizens' ability to throw the rascals out seems
fundamental to modem representative democracy because it is
the ultimate guarantee of a connection between citizens and
policymakers. It enables the citizens to hold the policymakers
accountable for their performance. Such accountability is a
keystone of majoritarian democratic theory.8 3
Although the Supreme Court last term addressed the first major
partisan gerrymandering case since Bandemer, the Court's decision
in Vieth v. Jubelirers" did little to stem the concern over the loss of
competitive accountability in American politics. Vieth was brought
as a challenge by Pennsylvania Democrats to a Republican carve up
of the state. In part, the lack of focus on loss of competition was a
result of the question presented. The issue in Vieth, as in Bandemer,
concerned a claim by one of the major parties that it received less
than a proportionate share of the seats it deserved, as opposed to a
claim that there was a systemic defect in the redistricting process.
Even under this limited claim, the Court revealed itself to be at a
loss over the problem of gerrymandering. Justice Scalia's plurality
81. Id. at 752-54.
82. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM & DEMOCRACY 167-70 (2003); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269-73 (6th ed., Unwin Paperbacks
1987) (1943); Issacharoff, Gerrymandering,supra note 73, at 600.
83. G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 47 (2000).
84. 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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opinion would have taken the doctrinal quagmire as an opportunity
to overrule Bandemer and simply declare political gerrymandering
claims non-justiciable. 8 Justice Kennedy was willing to condemn
the Pennsylvania map for abandoning all "restraint,"6 but also
willing to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that he
had yet to find a workable test for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims. The remaining Justices dissented, all convinced that
there must be a claim stated in political gerrymandering claims, but
disagreed on the nature of the proof required for such a claim. 7
The final holding in Vieth rested on the inability of the parties
before the Court to overcome one of the standard criteria that
forecloses any judicial result by rendering a claim a nonjusticiable
political question-namely, "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it." 8 But if the harm is
identified as the lack of competitiveness in the political process
overall, it is difficult to see how the bulk of voters can properly
mount and preserve a claim against the diminution of political
competition in the case of the greater threat of a bipartisan
gerrymander. The effect of gerrymandering is to give most voters
the chance to vote for the candidate of choice in rigged districts--or
at least to let them cast a vote for the victorious candidate. The
harm is systemic rather than specific, raising practical barriers to
gathering sufficient interest to actually press a challenge, as well as
juridicial barriers such as standing. As a result, most challenges are
brought not by voters facing a lack of competitive accountability in
the system as a whole, but by one or another of the political parties
claiming that they have been robbed. So it was with Vieth v.
Jubelirer, in which the Democratic Party of Pennsylvania stood
before the Court in the putative posture of a disfavored minority
along the lines of southern blacks facing the vestiges of Jim Crow.
One need look no further than the governorship of Pennsylvania or
the mayoralty of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh to see that the
85. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778.
86. Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. For a fuller exposition of Vieth, see Samuel Issacharoff& Pamela S. Karlan, Where To
Draw the Line?: Vieth v. Jubelirer, Cox v. Larios, And Judicial Review of Political
Gerrymanders, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
88. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1776 (plurality opinion) (quoting Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962)).
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Democratic Party would make an odd inheritor of the tradition of
special judicial solicitude for those incapable of fending for themselves in the rough and tumble world of politics.
Elsewhere I have argued that the Court should intercede not to
determine whether the right or wrong candidates are winning
elections, as the petitioners in Vieth come perilously close to
demanding, but instead should intervene surgically or prophylactically to remove from insiders control of the levers that rob the
system of its competitive vitality.8 9 The cost of gerrymandering is
unfortunately the polarization of representative bodies and the
increased distance of elected representatives from the median
preferences of the voting public.
V. CALIFORNIA DREAMING

My argument thus far has focused on the paradox that direct
democracy threatens an excess of majoritarianism, yet emerges as
a safeguard against an insufficiency of ultimate accountability to
majority preferences. At some level of abstraction, this has been the
central tension in American constitutional law governing the
political process. Cases such as Reynolds v. Sims," for example,
valorize the voting power of the majority and strike down malapportioned districts on the grounds that the majority is unable to
exercise its ultimate right to prevail in electoral politics. 9' At the
same time, decades of constitutional and statutory law designed
to prevent minority vote dilution attempt to limit what political

89. See Issacharoff, Gerrymandering,supra note 73.
90. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
91. Id. at 561-68, 586-87. According to the Warren opinion:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters,
not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form
of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators
in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.... [Ihf a
State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be
given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in
another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of
those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.
Id. at 562.
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theorists from Madison9 2 to Guinier 3 identify as the potential for
the tyranny of the majority. The risk in direct democracy is that the
absence of mediating institutions will collapse all politics into the
prevailing sentiment of even a small majority, without the measuring influence of factoring in intensity of preferences, legislative
compromise, trade-offs, and other features of give-and-take politics.
Direct democracy appears in a different guise, however, when
non-competitive elections have driven legislative power toward
extremes in which compromise becomes rare, political grandstanding emerges as the norm, and effective governance ends up a
casualty of fratricidal partisanship. Viewed in this light, California's
experiment with direct democracy reveals both strains. There is
ample evidence that when given choice without responsibility,
Californians will repeatedly vote themselves benefits without
burdens, mandating generous social benefits while eliminating the
tax burden that should pay for them. Indeed, many have written of
the devastating effect that this has had on the political and fiscal
life of the state. 4 At the same time, the initiative has become the
weapon of choice in several moves to recapture the median voter's
political strength.
First, through ballot initiative, Californians approved a blanket
primary system. Under this system, primary voters could choose
their favorite candidate for each office from any party, choosing
members of different parties for different offices.9 5 Supporters of the
92. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (theorizing that purpose of Union is to
prevent potential for factions to exercise destructive tyranny).
93. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 1-20 (1994).
94. See, e.g., Peter Schrag, Take the Initiative,Please:Referendum Madness in California,
28 Am. PROSPECT 61, 63 (1996).
[Tihe initiative has by general agreement become the principal driver of policy
in California, sometimes for the good, but more often not. The cumulative effect
of the plebiscitary reforms of the past two decades has been to strip cities, school
districts, and especially counties of their ability to generate their own funds; to
divide authority and responsibility uncertainly between state and local
government and among scores of agencies; and to make it increasingly unclear
who is ultimately accountable for the results of all these changes.
Id.
95. See David G. Savage, Justices Sound Dubious of'Blanket Primary,'L.A. TIMES, Apr.
25,2000, at Al. This system is different from the so-called "open primary" systems which exist
in other states, in that during an open primary, a voter can choose in which party's primary
she would like to participate on election day, but is bound to choosing candidates from that
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blanket primary had specifically hoped it would restore power to
moderate voters by allowing cross-over voting in the nomination
process, particularly in districts lacking in bipartisan competition.9 6
This approach failed when the Supreme Court found blanket
primaries to violate the freedom of association rights of political
party loyalists to be free from outside interference in their primary
processes.97
Without the possibility of influencing the election by controlling
the selection of candidates, moderate voters decided to do away with
what may be thought of as regularly scheduled elections. In
recalling Governor Davis and replacing him with Governor
Schwarzenegger, California voters succeeded where they failed with
the blanket primary process. In Schwarzenegger, moderates found
a Republican who, although fiscally conservative, is far to the left of
the normal California Republican establishment-one who is prochoice, socially liberal, and a member of the Hollywood elite. In an
ultimate distinction from his fellow Republicans, his election was
met with the congratulations of such liberals as Senator Edward
Kennedy, who is, coincidentally, Schwarzenegger's wife's uncle.
Such a candidate could not have emerged in either the Republican
or Democratic nominating processes.9 8 Yet, in a crowded field of over
130 candidates ranging from the serious to the deranged, the
glamorous to the titillating, Schwarzenegger emerged with a
stunning fifty percent of the vote.
So the median voter has warned that mechanisms of direct
democracy may allow a check on self-interested politics that drive
too far from the center. In her newly found voice, she may be heard
to utter the campaign call to arms: "I'll be back."

party for all offices. Id.
96. See David Kelly, Major Party Leaders Hail 'Blanket Primary'Rejection, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 2000, at B1.
97. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
98. Garrett, supra note 2 (manuscript at 22-23).

